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To defend American agriculture against foreign or domestic terrorism, it is 
essential that states build multi-state partnerships to provide for the collaborative plans, 
programs and operations needed to protect the nations food security.  The National 
Homeland Security Strategy puts states on the front lines in the war against terrorism---
including the struggle to secure the agriculture industry from potentially devastating 
attack.  The issues surrounding agro-terrorism are vast and complex and the resources of 
the Federal government to address these issues are limited and overextended.  If states 
attempt to address this threat independently, important opportunities to reduce 
vulnerability and enhance capability will be lost.  To achieve the capabilities needed for 
agro terrorism detection, mitigation, preparedness and response, states must collaborate 
to build the partnerships and programs their citizens require.  This thesis argues multi-
state partnerships are critical to defeating this threat as well as providing a robust 
response to an attack.  Whether intentionally introduced or naturally occurring, infectious 
diseases can easily cross state borders before an outbreak is even detected. States must be 
prepared to act quickly to mitigate the effects of any crisis.  There is a significant 
opportunity for states to strengthen their abilities to provide for a stronger agriculture 
counter terrorism preparedness system.  The states can further their ability to combat 
attacks on agriculture actively by demonstrating leadership in implementing 
administrative agreements and ultimately adopting compact(s) between states as well as 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To defend American agriculture against foreign or domestic terrorism, it is 
essential that states build multi-state partnerships to provide for the collaborative plans, 
programs and operations needed to protect the nations food security.  The President’s 
National Homeland Security Strategy puts States on the front lines in the war against 
terrorism---including the struggle to secure the agriculture industry from potentially 
devastating attack.  The issues surrounding agro-terrorism are vast and complex and the 
resources of the Federal government to address these issues are limited and overextended.  
If states attempt to address this threat independently, important opportunities to reduce 
vulnerability and enhance capability will be lost.  For example, given the highly 
contagious nature of the Foot and Mouth Disease as well as many other potential 
weapons of agro-terrorism, it is most certain the consequences of an attack on one state 
will soon affect others.  To achieve the capabilities needed for agro-terrorism detection, 
mitigation, preparedness and response, states must collaborate to build the partnerships 
and programs their citizens require.  
What is desirable in not always politically easy.  Practically every state in the 
nation utilizes an interstate compact or an interstate administrative agreement to achieve 
mutually agreed objectives.  However, as in many areas of Homeland Security, (where 
the nation faces new challenges in developing the strategies, plans and organizational 
structures to address the threat of terrorism), states have virtually no experience in 
building partnerships to defeat agro terrorism.  Bureaucratic inertia and fear of the new 
state involvement may place a serious impediment to the development of inter-state 
partnerships to address agro-terrorism.   
This thesis explains why and how those impediments must be overcome.  The 
author explains why, given the nature of the threat, multi-state compacts or agreements 
are necessary for success.  The author also analyzes the goals and components that inter-
state initiatives must incorporate in order to be effective.  In addition, there is an 
examination of the process by which states can be brought into collaborative 
relationships, despite the political difficulties of doing so. 
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The threat of agro-terrorism is severe. The vulnerabilities are many. An attack on 
American agriculture, even one that might be considered minimal and isolated, could 
have far-reaching economic ramifications in markets worldwide. An economic attack on 
America becomes an economic attack upon the rest of the world. Essentially, an 
American vulnerability in agriculture will become a global vulnerability in agriculture. 
USDA officials estimate that a single agro-terrorist attack on the livestock industry using 
a highly infective agent could cost the U.S. economy between $10 billion and $30 
billion.1  As this level of impact ripples across international livestock markets, the global 
impact of an attack on America’s livestock could reach into the hundreds of billions of 
dollars. 
This thesis argues multi-state partnerships are critical to defeating this threat as 
well as providing a robust response to an attack.  Whether intentionally introduced or 
naturally occurring , infectious diseases can easily cross state borders before an outbreak 
is even detected. States must be prepared to act quickly to mitigate the effects of any 
crisis.  To be effective the partnership should have strong principles and objectives.  It 
should create a system for states to participate in joint planning, education, training and 
exercise opportunities to build a unified approach in building state and federal 
surveillance and response capacity; it should promote awareness of agro-security issues 
within all levels of government; it should improve coordination and information sharing 
among agencies at the federal, state and local levels to prevent and respond as well as 
develop joint strategies for maintaining public and consumer confidence.   The over all 
goals of the Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture are to collaborate in 
preparedness and reduce duplication of efforts in agriculture security.  
For some government officials, the task of building and implementing a multi-
state agreement for such a complex issue might at first appear daunting and over 
whelming.  When the author first began exploring the possibility of pursuing an interstate 
partnership for agro-terrorism, a number of the author’s colleagues said it had 
considerable merit, but wanted to ensure we had specific goals and objectives.  Two of 
the most challenging components to the process were securing adequate funding and 
                                                 
1 Alejandro E. Segarra, “Agro-Terrorism Options in Congress,” Report for Congress, (Congressional 
Research Service) July 17, 2002, p. 2. 
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conducting an effective interagency educational process.  The bringing together of state 
homeland security agencies, state agriculture and animal health organizations and state 
emergency management to identify the complex issues associated with agro-terrorism 
was a new adventure for all—with lessons that other states might want to consider in 
pursuing agreements of their own. 
This thesis also suggests broader implications for the way the United States needs 
to provide for Homeland Security.  Under the National Homeland Security Strategy, 
states must play a critical role in defeating terrorism.  As in agro-terrorism, however, 
many terror threats are likely to cross state lines.  The interstate partnership objectives 
and mechanisms proposed provide a model for states to adapt and revise, as appropriate, 
in response to other potential threats.  Implementing interstate partnerships in areas such 
as cyber security, critical asset protection and bio-emergency preparedness would 
enhance the overall national homeland security posture. 
Chapter I examines the nature of the threat, and highlights the reasons why states-
--acting alone---are unable to provide for the security of their own agricultural sector.  
Chapter II outlines the strategic goals of a multi-state agro-terrorism collaboration, 
specifically the Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture.  Chapter III provides 
a brief description of interstate compacts and administrative agreements, providing the 
pro’s and con’s of each.  Chapter IV provides the basic process in used creating an 
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 5 
II. AMERICAN AGRICULTURE AND A NATION AT RISK 
Agriculture is a weak link in the nation’s defense against terrorism2 
Jeff Greco 
One month before the terrorist attacks in America on September 11, 2001, a paper 
written by two prominent observers of global terrorism and political violence was 
published in a respectable academic journal. The paper provided a comprehensive yet 
conventional review of terrorist attacks through modern times and around the world. The 
authors concluded that it would be difficult for terrorists to attack American agriculture 
with a biological weapon because 1) delivering a biological agent to the target was 
replete with substantial and serious technical problems, 2) American crop and livestock 
production was not concentrated sufficiently to be at risk of such an attack, 3) current (i.e. 
as of August 2001) surveillance and detection systems and networks were sophisticated 
enough to thwart attempts to disrupt or destroy this asset, and 4) no evidence existed to 
suggest that any terrorist group in the world had the motivation to harm the America in 
this way.3  Thirty days later, these assumptions about American vulnerabilities would 
seem elementary if not arrogant. 
America’s agricultural sector is the nation’s single largest and potentially most 
vulnerable terrorist target. In 2001, the food and fiber industry in America employed 
nearly 24 million people, had an output of over $2 trillion, and generated 12.3 percent of 
the total gross domestic product.4  While farming alone constitutes only about 1 percent 
of the U.S. workforce and less than 1 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product, its 
effect on the American economy is immense.5  Vast and multiple industries related to  
                                                 
2 Jeff Greco, A Report from the Agricultural Committee of the Midwest Legislative Conference, The 
Council of State Governments, “Agricultural Terrorism in the Midwest: Risks, Threats and State 
Responses,” December 2002. 
3 Jason Pate and Gavin Cameron, “Convert Biological Weapons Attacks against Agricultural Targets: 
Assessing the Impact against U.S. Agriculture,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, ESDP-
2001-05, August 2001, p. 3. 
4 “Food Market Structures: the U.S. Food and Fiber System,” Economic Research Service, USDA, 
April 2003, available at www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/foodmarketstructures, accessed September 23, 2003. 
5 Kathryn L. Lipton, William Edmondson and Alden Manchester, “The Food and Fiber System: 
Contributing to the U.S. and World Economies,” USDA Economic Research Service, Agriculture 
Information Bulletin No. 742, July 1998. 
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farming, including seed, feed, fertilizer, machinery, food processing, manufacturing, 
transportation, and exporting, combine to create the largest integrated food and fiber 
system in the world. 
At the heart of this immense system is the heartland of the nation – the Great 
Plains states and the upper Midwest - and at the heart of the heartland is the state of Iowa. 
Iowa ranks first in the nation in terms of corn, soybean, egg, and hog production, 
accounting for 25 percent of America’s pork industry, 18 percent of its corn crop, 17.5 
percent of its soybean yield, and 12 percent of its egg production.6  When Iowa’s 
agricultural position is configured with the agricultural strength of the seven states that 
surround it, the agricultural production in key areas for these eight states as a percentage 
of total American agricultural output is staggering: 23 percent of America’s dairy 
products, 37 percent of its hogs, 41 percent of its cattle, 64 percent of its soybeans, and 
70 percent of its corn.7  A portion of the states that are a part of the multi-state 
agricultural security collaborative described in this paper are Illinois, Wisconsin, Kansas, 
Nebraska, South Dakota, Missouri, Minnesota. Jeff Greco, policy analyst with the 
Midwestern Office of The Council of State Governments and writer of the report  
Agricultural Terrorism in the Midwest writes, “The Midwest, home to more than 80 
million cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, and bison, is more economically exposed to the threat 
of agro-terrorism than any other region in the country.”8  
Both the enormous size and sheer complexity of the industry itself have 
influenced conventional thoughts about the invulnerability of American agriculture to 
disruption at the hands of either foreign or domestic terrorists.  These factors, coupled 
with the considerable diversity of American agriculture, lead many Americans in 
government, business, the media, and on Main Street to conclude that a certain natural 
                                                 
6 Iowa Fact Sheet, Data, Economic Research Service, USDA, July 15, 2003, available at 
www.ers.usda.gov/stateFacts/IA, accessed September 24, 2003. 
7 Fact Sheets, Data for Illinois, Wisconsin, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, Missouri, Minnesota, 
Economic Research Service, USDA, July 15, 2003, available at www.ers.usda.gov/stateFacts, accessed 
September 24, 2003. 
8 Jeff Greco, A Report from the Agricultural Committee of the Midwest Legislative Conference, The 
Council of State Governments, “Agricultural Terrorism in the Midwest: Risks, Threats and State 
Responses,” December 2002, p. 6. 
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resilience to attack exists in this sector alone that does not exist in any other sector in 
America’s colossal economic infrastructure. The perception prevails that these factors 
have created some kind of invisible security blanket making our food and fiber system 
“invulnerable to a catastrophic sub-national BW [biological weapon] attack with a 
significant economic impact.”9   
This conventional wisdom is buttressed by the notion that agro-terrorism simply 
is not an adequate platform to produce mass casualties in the range of the fatalities that 
occurred on September 11, 2001 or higher.10  In this sense, it would appear to be quite 
difficult to produce a “weapon of mass destruction” that would compromise hundreds of 
thousands of acres of corn or wheat or millions of head of hogs or cattle so that thousands 
of Americans would die from their consumption. Conventional wisdom is probably right 
on this point, but it is an irrelevant point on which to base security decisions. The disaster 
preparedness paradigm that leads to this conclusion that American agriculture is safe 
because it is big and hard to contaminate is itself a faulty paradigm. It assumes too much 
from a pre-September 11 world and it ignores emerging insights about the strategic and 
tactical changes occurring in the terrorist mindset. 
America is a nation at risk because its food and fiber network, as well as its entire 
economic system, have become the focus of both international and homegrown terrorist 
organizations. Hundreds of U.S. agricultural documents translated into Arabic were 
seized in Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion of that country.11  The documents were 
attributed to the al Queda terrorist network and suggest more than a passing interest in 
American agricultural terrorism.12  The leader of the al Queda network, Osama bin 
Laden, quoted on tape on October 6, 2002, emphasized the importance and attractiveness 
                                                 
9 Jason Pate and Gavin Cameron, “Convert Biological Weapons Attacks against Agricultural Targets: 
Assessing the Impact against U.S. Agriculture,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, ESDP-
2001-05, August 2001, p. 20. 
10 Jeff Greco, A Report from the Agricultural Committee of the Midwest Legislative Conference, The 
Council of State Governments, “Agricultural Terrorism in the Midwest: Risks, Threats and State 
Responses,” December 2002, p. 4. 
11 Katherine McIntire Peters, “Officials Fear Terrorist Attack on U.S. Food Supply,” GovExec.com, 




of America’s economy in the strategy he is pursuing. “By God, the youths of God are 
preparing for you things that would fill your hearts with terror and target your economic 
lifeline until you stop your oppression and aggression.”13  His chief lieutenant, Ayman al-
Zawahiri was even more specific on the same tape.  
The settlement of this overburdened account will indeed be heavy. We 
will also aim to continue, by permission of Allah, the destruction of the 
American economy.14 
Domestic terrorist groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the 
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) have executed 600 violent acts since 1996, causing more 
than $40 million in damage.15  The FBI describes these groups as “patchwork 
confederations of saboteurs” whose agendas include arson and vandalism against 
individuals or industries perceived to be harming animals or the environment.16  When 
ALF and ELF combined with groups such as the Last Chance for Animals and the People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), the estimated membership is more than 
one million Americans.17  Membership in these organizations does not automatically 
make an American a domestic terrorist. Indeed, it may be true that only a fraction of 
those Americans belonging to these organizations actually engage in terrorist activity. 
However, there should be cause for alarm when the co-founder and president of PETA, 
Ingrid Newkirk, in an April 2001 Reuters news story titled “Hoping for Disease: PETA 




                                                 
13 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction [Gilmore Commission], Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress, II, 
Reassuring the Threat, December 15, 2002,Chapter 2, p. 10. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Todd Milbourn, “Lawmakers Target ‘Eco-Terrorism’,” Star Tribune (Minneapolis), April 7, 2002, 
available at www.amprogress.org/news/newsprint, accessed September 24, 2003. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Aaron Putze, “Public Must Take a Stand Against Animal Rights,” Iowa Farm Bureau, November 2, 
2001, available at http://furcommission.com/resource/perspect999ap.htm, accessed September 2003. 
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I openly hope that it comes here. It will bring economic harm only for 
those who profit from giving people heart attacks and giving animals a 
concentration camp-like existence. It would be good for animals, good for 
human health and good for the environment.18   
Rhetoric like this suggests radical American advocacy groups may increasingly be 
inclined to embrace terrorist-like tactics to imitate the success of foreign terrorist groups.  
At the very least, the PETA statement sends a strong signal that threats to American 
agriculture are not beyond our shores. Rather, these “saboteurs” are right at our doors – in 
the form of our neighbors, co-workers, and friends – and they are Americans. 
It is true that American agriculture is vast and diverse and these factors contribute 
to the sense that this food and fiber system is to some extent immune from catastrophic 
disruption. However, this system is also highly concentrated. A good example is the 
livestock industry, which is concentrated in just a few essential geographic sectors: cattle 
feeding in western Kansas, hogs in Iowa, Nebraska, and North Carolina, and poultry in 
Virginia, Georgia, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and Maryland’s Eastern Shore district.19  
Furthermore, America’s agricultural economy is highly integrated with the global 
economy. Exports of American agricultural products account for 15 percent of all global 
agricultural exports. Additionally, the United States in 1998 produced nearly half of the 
world’s soybeans, more than 40 percent of its corn, 20 percent of its cotton, 12 percent of 
its wheat, and 16 percent of its meat.20 
Any attack on American agriculture, even one that might be considered minimal 
and isolated, could have far-reaching economic ramifications in markets worldwide. An 
economic attack in America becomes an economic attack upon the rest of the world. 
Essentially, an American vulnerability in agriculture will become a global vulnerability in 
agriculture. USDA officials estimate that a single agro-terrorist attack on the livestock 
                                                 
18 Alan Elsner, Reuters, “Hoping for Disease: PETA Hopes Foot-and-Mouth Strikes in the United 
States,” ABCNews.com, April 2, 2001, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/peta.01402, accessed September 24, 2003. 
19 Joseph W. Foxell, Jr., “Current Trends in Agro-Terrorism (Antilivestock, Anticrop, and Antisoil 
Bioagricultural Terrorism) and Their Potential Impact on Food Security,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, March 2000, p. 110. 
20 Katherine McIntire Peters, “Officials Fear Terrorist Attack on U.S. Food Supply,” GovExec.com, 
June 10, 2003, available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/o603/061003kpl, accessed September 24, 
2003. 
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industry using a highly infective agent could cost the U.S. economy between $10 billion 
and $30 billion.21  As this level of impact ripples across international livestock markets, 
the global impact of an attack on America’s livestock could reach into the hundreds of 
billions of dollars. 
In his paper, Current Trends in Agro-terrorism and Their Potential Impact on 
Food Security, Joseph Foxell, Jr. identifies a number of reasons why American 
agriculture is becoming both a more attractive target of terrorism and more susceptible to 
devastating disorder.22 
• The U.S. food business is moving in the direction of centralized ownership 
and larger individual farms. Already the pork industry is so concentrated 
that the top 40 producers control 90 percent of production. By the end of 
this decade, America’s domestic beef industry will become 
organizationally aggregated to the degree that the 30 leading cattle feeding 
operations will generate 50 percent of all beef products. [Michael Dunn, a 
bio-terrorism expert at the New York Academy of Sciences, shares this 
outlook of the future.23] 
• Intensive-proximity husbandry practices have reduced the free-range 
movement of farm animals on many of the largest farms, thus making the 
American poultry and livestock industries more vulnerable to the spread of 
both indigenous and foreign-originating infectious diseases. A typical 
poultry farm has between 250,000 and 2 million birds and dairy herds 
often contain ten thousand cows.  
• Higher levels of international air travel have drastically reduced the 
isolation that had previously protected American poultry, livestock, and 
field crops from foreign illnesses or pests. This has exacerbated this 
country’s vulnerability to either accidental or deliberate infestation or 
infection. 
• An increasing reliance on pesticides and herbicides to control crop pests 
such as insects and weeds has established a precursor state, wherein 
pesticide-immune and herbicide-resistant antagonists could decimate 
arable crop staples. 
                                                 
21 Alejandro E. Segarra, “Agro-Terrorism Options in Congress,” Report for Congress, (Congressional 
Research Service) July 17, 2002, p. 2. 
22 Joseph W. Foxell, Jr., “Current Trends in Agro-Terrorism (Antilivestock, Anticrop, and Antisoil 
Bioagricultural Terrorism) and Their Potential Impact on Food Security,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, March 2000, pp. 111-113.   
23 Jeff Greco, A Report from the Agricultural Committee of the Midwest Legislative Conference, The 
Council of State Governments, “Agricultural Terrorism in the Midwest: Risks, Threats and State 
Responses,” December 2002, p. 6. 
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• A lack of crop diversity renders U.S. farmlands especially vulnerable to 
“cropicide” agro-terrorist attacks. This dearth of variety has resulted from 
the American farmer’s widespread practice of growing only one to two 
types of major food crops, as opposed to diversified farming, where 
different food crops are mixed and rotated to reduce pest damage and keep 
the soil fertile. The lack of diversity, wherein single crops are grown over 
thousands of acres, renders the entire crop susceptible to a single 
pathological organism. 
• This lack of diversity is compounded by the fact that 80 percent of the 
nation’s seed derives from one locale, the Idaho valley, due to the 
exceptionally dry climate in the region. 
• A notable percentage of imported hybrid seed used for crop production in 
the United States comes from just four countries: Mexico, Chile, Iran, and 
China. Worryingly, the latter two countries are suspected of having covert 
bio-agricultural weapons development programs. Reliance on so few 
sources for the purchase of imported seed begets the possibility that agro-
terrorists could silently enter diseased seed into the filled orders shipped to 
the United States. 
• America’s soil itself is an ignored, and hence, inadequately protected, 
resource. Perhaps as much as half of the nation’s topsoil blanket that 
existed 50 years ago has been lost due to runoff, intensive heavy 
equipment usage, and winds. Agro-terrorist schemes that threaten topsoil 
viability – most likely through the use of a long-acting soil sterilant – pose 
long-term dangers to America’s farmland productivity. 
• A variety of pathogenic or market-value inhibiting agents foreign to U.S. 
farm animals and crops – and hence could spread rapidly in the absence of 
natural immunities or predators – are readily obtainable from a multitude 
of overseas sources. It is believed that American agriculture and livestock 
are highly vulnerable to many of these agents. 
As the offensive war on terror accelerates in the world and as U.S. and 
international law enforcement and intelligence services disrupt the capacity for al Qaeda 
and similar affiliate groups to conduct mass casualty attacks inside the United States, 
these groups are likely to utilize smaller-scale tactics against more accessible, softer 
targets.24  Perhaps the most under-regarded asset in America in terms of accurate threat  
                                                 
24 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction [Gilmore Commission], Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress, II, 
Reassuring the Threat, December 15, 2002, p. 10. 
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assessments, response structures, and preparedness initiatives is American agriculture.25  
A USDA report on agro-terrorism prepared for Congress in 2002 suggested “every link in 
the agricultural production chain is susceptible to attack with a biological weapon.”26 
Coupled with this apparent and alarming vulnerability is the allure of the novelty 
of such an attack in America. Al Qaeda has deftly demonstrated its ability to use our own 
resources against us in its cost-effective use of jetliners careening into the World Trade 
Center.27 If similar acts of such dramatic violence are thwarted or crippled through 
America’s heightened security measures implemented through the nation’s homeland 
security initiative, terrorists could turn to other means and other targets to accomplish 
their goals. This evolution in tactics will be particularly important if more conventional 
attacks no longer bring the desired substantial outcomes. Foxell summaries this tactical 
shift and the likely result: 
While in recent decades terrorists have relied on simple, direct, low-
technology action (such as hijacking airplanes and ships and truck-
bombing), there is a growing threat that some terrorists will resort to 
agriculture-based strategies in coming years. Walter Laqueur, in his essay 
Postmodern Terrorism, argues that, if terrorists continue to find their 
presently held conventional weapons satisfactory, they will have no need 
to use other methods or devices. This would likely exclude their 
experimentation with anti-livestock, anti-crop, and anti-soil weaponry. 
However, Laqueur observes, if after years of struggle such groups have 
made only insignificant progress, they may be tempted to switch to  
Armageddon-type strategies, wherein their organization’s desperate last 
gasp may be a suicidal gambit to either succeed or doom themselves, their 
opponents, and conceivably the rest of the world.28 
 
 
                                                 
25 Testimony of Dr. Peter Chalk, Terrorism, Infrastructure Protection, and The U.S. Food and 
Agriculture Sector, Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the 
District of Columbia, October 10, 2001, p. 2. 
26 Alejandro E. Segarra, “Agro-Terrorism Options in Congress,” Report for Congress, (Congressional 
Research Service) July 17, 2002, p. 6. 
27 Ibid., p. 13. 
28 Joseph W. Foxell, Jr., “Current Trends in Agro-Terrorism (Antilivestock, Anticrop, and Antisoil 
Bioagricultural Terrorism) and Their Potential Impact on Food Security,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, March 2000, p. 126. 
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He also stresses the new terrorist mindset: 
What we are now confronting is a radically different environment in 
which religious fanatics, chauvinists, and single-issue extremists can seek 
to inflict widespread indiscriminate ecological destruction to further their 
cause, no matter how arcane or idiosyncratic, with no fear of alienating the 
larger public, because their constituency is limited to a narrow patrimony 
of followers uninterested in opinions outside of their group…These 
changes in terrorist motivation and psychology will ultimately reshape the 
terrorist’s choice of targets and weapons agents.29 
Unfortunately for the American people, an agro-terrorist attack using a biological 
weapon will not be difficult to execute. There are no great technical or operational 
difficulties to overcome in this arena. Experts suggest that agricultural agents are easier to 
prepare than biological agents because source materials are easier to locate from a wide 
range of plant and animal infective agents on the farm or in the wild.30  Furthermore, 
the physical resources (i.e. laboratory facilities, calibrated condensing 
vessels, pre-set gauges, specialty apparatuses, freeze dryers, milling 
machines, centrifuges, micro-fine air filters, and fermentation tanks) 
needed for manufacturing such bio-agricultural weapons agents are readily 
available to almost everyone in the scientific, pharmaceutical, and 
agribusiness communities. Worse, large amounts of various types of anti-
livestock, anti-crop, and anti-soil bio-agricultural agents can be made in 
high school science laboratories, often within a period of hours or days.31 
A. AGRO-TERRORISM – A WEAPON OF MASS EFFECT 
Many U.S. assumptions about the safety of American agriculture, the risks to the 
food and fiber system, and even about the tactics of terrorists themselves may be 
radically out of step with reality. So much attention in this nation before and after 
September 11, 2001 attacks has been devoted to the term “weapon of mass destruction”, 
few saw that threat relating to agriculture. It is not easily possible to picture a jetliner 
crashing into a farm field in the middle of Iowa and conceive of anything more than a 
few scorched acres of corn as the economic aftermath. Again, it is not easily possible to 
conceive of terrorists, either domestic or foreign-based, having the capacity to produce 
hundreds of thousands of barrels of herbicide to wipe out millions of acres of grain.  As 
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 121. 
30 Ibid., p. 108. 
31 Ibid., p. 109. 
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well, it is difficult to imagine how terrorists could contaminate a sizeable part of the 
millions of pounds of processed meat consumed in America in a single day. In this 
current paradigm, it is a struggle to see “mass destruction” as a viable outcome of any 
kind of terrorist attack on American agriculture – ostensibly the nation’s single largest 
economic asset. 
The problem with this paradigm is that the focus of agro-terrorism is on “effect” 
not on “destruction.” The goal of agro-terrorism may be to produce a level of economic 
harm or disruption that produces a level of fear so as to maximize the loss of social 
welfare. The effect of agro-terrorism, in terms of the permanent destabilization of the 
American way of life – American values, traditions, and expectations for the future – will 
be immeasurably more potent and long-lasting than the explosion of an airplane or a 
building. The objective of terror is to create fear,32 and no greater fear could affect more 
Americans than the fear that the food they eat may not be safe. 
In reality, such fear may be superficial or have no basis in fact. Regardless of how 
grounded the fear might be, the consequences to America’s economy from the shock of 
such an attack and lingering doubts about the efficacy of future security provisions, 
would create a cascade of negative impacts for months. Not only would there be direct 
economic losses resulting from lost production in the affected sector, but there would be 
costs to bear in disease containment measures, such as pharmaceuticals and pesticides, 
and multiplier effects in related industries such as transportation, processing, and 
exporting. As one author wrote, “By interrupting the physical supply chain, the terrorist 
can cause economic harm through an artificial price increase, but by creating fear, and 
ultimately hysteresis, the terrorist can exacerbate the economic losses by affecting human 
behavior.”33  This kind of fear will produce a profound loss of consumer confidence, not 
unlike that caused in the airline and tourist industries following September 11, 2001, that 
could be difficult to restore fully even after the government has emphatically and 
repeatedly reassured the American people that conditions are safe. 
                                                 
32 Calum G. Turvey, Edourd Maforia, Brian Schilling and Benjamin Onyango, “Economics, 
Hysteresis and Agro-Terrorism,” Food Policy Institute, Rutgers, Working Paper No. WP0703-011, July 27-
30, 2003, p. 6. 
33 Ibid. 
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Many examples exist around the world of severe economic impacts when a 
nation’s food delivery is either rumored to be at risk or attacked. The Chilean grape scare 
in 1989 that allegedly involved cyanide contamination resulted in a $210 million loss to 
the industry when consumers stopped buying the produce, even though no poison was 
ever discovered, no one became ill or died, and no evidence of an actual attack ever 
materialized.34  In 1978, Israeli orange exports to Europe were reduced 40 percent after 
twelve people were injured when they ate oranges contaminated with liquid mercury by 
the Arab Revolutionary Council.35  In 2000, Israeli agricultural inspectors discovered that 
for a year and a half the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had used counterfeit 
stamps on expired and salmonella-ridden eggs sold throughout Israel.36  In April 1988, an 
Italian group sympathetic to the PLO claimed to have contaminated Israeli grapefruit 
with poison. Some grapefruit were injected with a harmless substance, but the result was 
the withdrawal of all Israeli grapefruit from the country.37  Similarly devastating 
outcomes are always the result of outbreaks of infectious livestock diseases or of pest 
infestations. A litany of case studies from around the world document the slaughter of 
millions of cattle, hogs, and chickens and the destruction of millions of tons of produce 
from the introduction of contaminating agents.38 
These documented losses are the result of actual infestations, but the same kind of 
economic impact could be expected in a contamination scenario grounded more in rumor 
than in fact. A small and relatively insignificant outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease on 
an isolated cattle operation in west Kansas could fuel a national firestorm of panicked  
                                                 
34 Jeff Greco, A Report from the Agricultural Committee of the Midwest Legislative Conference, The 
Council of State Governments, “Agricultural Terrorism in the Midwest: Risks, Threats and State 
Responses,” December 2002, p. 3. 
35 Jason Pate and Gavin Cameron, “Convert Biological Weapons Attacks against Agricultural Targets: 
Assessing the Impact against U.S. Agriculture,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, ESDP-
2001-05, August 2001, p. 8. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., p. 9. 
38 Joseph W. Foxell, Jr., “Current Trends in Agro-Terrorism (Antilivestock, Anticrop, and Antisoil 
Bioagricultural Terrorism) and Their Potential Impact on Food Security,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, March 2000, pp. 113-120. 
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consumers who would likely stop their beef consumption for weeks or months. The 
fallout could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of head of cattle and include 
livestock possibly not infected at all. 
A Rutgers Food Policy Institute paper Economics, Hysteresis and Agro-terrorism, 
attempts to explain the cycle of human behavior in the economic sector before and after 
an attack on America’s food supply. Prior to an attack, the public may perceive that a risk 
to the food system exists, but the risk may not be comprehended to the extent that actual 
buying patterns are substantially altered. Americans may suspect that an attack on the 
food chain could occur, but may prefer to believe that such an attack is actually quite 
remote. On the other hand, the public’s perception of risk following an agro-terrorist 
attack may significantly alter their buying habits for a very long time.39  The authors 
describe the phenomena as “consumer hysteresis.” 
The issue is why consumer resistance persists either when the probabilities 
of harm are so low, (e.g. BSE and Crautzfeld-Jacob Disease CJD), when 
terrorist activities were resolved (e.g. Chilean grapes) or safeguards put in 
place to protect the food supply (e.g. Guatemalan raspberries). One 
argument is what we will refer to as consumer hysteresis…a phenomena 
that causes consumers to fail to reverse their consumption habits when the 
underlying source of uncertainty or ambiguity has reversed itself.40 
This lingering fear of impending danger, even long after the aftermath of an actual 
attack, has subsided and demonstrable security measures to prevent future attacks have 
been implemented, is precisely the kind of “mass effect” an evolving terrorist strategy 
would aim to achieve. Long-term economic stagnation in the United States and across the 
world, triggered by a profound loss of consumer confidence, could lead to a worldwide 
depression and conceivably the destabilization of innumerable governments, including 
that of the United States. As the Gilmore Commission reported in its fourth report, “Al  
                                                 
39 Calum G. Turvey, Edourd Maforia, Brian Schilling and Benjamin Onyango, “Economics, 
Hysteresis and Agro-Terrorism,” Food Policy Institute, Rutgers, Working Paper No. WP0703-011, July 27-
30, 2003, p. 7. 
40 Ibid., p. 11. 
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Qaeda has demonstrated that it can have mass effects – a significant disruption of society, 
huge economic losses, strong reactions by governments – without the necessity of using 
an unconventional weapon – a so-called ‘weapon of mass destruction.’”41   
Taken together, these features of the threat to agriculture highlight the need for 
states to collaborate against the threat.  The cross-state integration of agriculture 
industries; the highly contagious nature of many potential agro-terrorism weapons; the 
need for coordinated public affairs strategies to respond to the psychological effects of an 
agro-terror attack; all of these characteristics create an imperative that states explore 
opportunities to work together.   
                                                 
41 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction [Gilmore Commission], Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress, II, 
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III. STRATEGIC GOALS OF A MULTI-STATE AGRO-
TERRORISM COLLABORATIVE 
Given the nature of the threat examined in Chapter I, it is evident that states have 
a need to collaborate in building the capacity to detect an attack against the agriculture 
industry.  It is also evident there is a need to provide for a stronger preparedness and 
response capability to address the threat of agro-terrorism.  What should multi-state 
partnerships strive to accomplish?  What particular objectives do they need to achieve 
ultimate coordination and reduction in redundancy?  What strategies, plans and programs 
do they need to identify and develop? 
The Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture provides a case study as to 
how one group of states within the United States are working to answer these questions, 
with valuable lessons for other regions to examine and (after suitable modification) apply 
to their own unique requirements and circumstances. 
In Brigett’s42 article on state supremacy, she summarizes (paraphrased below) the 
key benefits that can lead states to collaborate, either through informal cooperation or 
through formal interstate compacts.  Interstate collaborate can: 
• Enlarges a state’s sphere of power 
• Combats federal sensitivity toward state interests 
• Negotiation is limited to the states involved, excluding unproductive 
forces 
• Negotiation likely to result in efficiency 
• Increases an individual states’ representative power 
• Allows states to pool resources and those of the federal government 
A desire to gain the benefits of collaboration in the realm of agro-terrorism led 
officials from Iowa, Missouri, Illinois, and Wisconsin to begin exploring the pursuit of a 
multi-state approach in July 2003.   
                                                 
42 M. S. Briggett, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate Compact. Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review, vol. 12, no. 4 (1995), pp. 751-772. Council of State Governments, 
Programs, Interstate Compacts, available at 
http://www.csg.org/CSG/Programs/interstate+compacts/default.htm, accessed August 2003.   
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The Partnership’s mission statement that was ultimately developed recognizes the 
fundamentally important role states must have in the nation’s comprehensive response to 
terrorism. 
The Multi-state Partnership for Security in Agriculture was created by 
states to ensure that America’s agricultural system is secure, its citizens 
are safe and its economy is strong.  Through this interstate agreement, 
states will collaborate on surveillance of, preparation for, and response to 
threats in agriculture, whether intentionally introduced or naturally 
occurring, and coordinate these efforts with all levels of Government.43 
During an initial discussion session in July, state officials44 drafted key 
partnership principles, including several strategic goals listed below. 
• Promote awareness of agro-terrorism vulnerabilities and consequences at 
all levels of government. 
• Build an understanding of common concerns and vulnerabilities with 
regard to safety and security of the U.S. food supply and agriculture. 
• Develop a protocol for resource sharing that addresses the issues of 
resource coordination, laboratory capacity, information sharing, joint 
planning, education, training, and exercise opportunities, and interstate 
surveillance. 
• Develop a unified approach with specific security standards to animal and 
food security, specifically addressing issues regarding disease detection, 
animal identification, and animal movement, between states, federal 
agencies, and private industry. 
• Develop joint strategies for maintaining public and consumer confidence. 
The original discussion group was expanded to encompass additional states and 
various state government departments, and a kickoff summit was held in Des Moines, 
Iowa in August 2003. Agency representatives from emergency management, homeland 
security, agriculture, and state veterinarians attended from the states of Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota and Wisconsin. The states of 
Kentucky and Oklahoma have joined the Partnership since the August summit. Through 
consensus, the state representatives identified many areas for potential collaboration and 
agreed to form a partnership specifically designed to address the issues they had 
identified.  The partnership created three workgroups that were asked to focus on 
                                                 
43 Mission Statement for the Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture, August 2003. 
44 IA, MO, IL, WI. 
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cooperative resource sharing agreements, state-to-state collaboration, and state-to-federal 
relations. From this meeting, the partnership created a work plan45 to structure future 
activities.  
A. COOPERATIVE RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENTS WORKGROUP 
The Cooperative Resource Sharing Agreements Workgroup, led by the State of 
Missouri, explored the use of resource sharing agreements. The overarching focus would 
include food safety, including plants, livestock and the safety of the U.S. food supply in 
the processing and distribution stages. Some of the focus areas for this work group 
included:  
• The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a classic example of 
interstate sharing of resources.  The workgroup identified the need to 
explore the use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact in 
agricultural disasters. For example, in the past there have been legal 
questions regarding the reciprocal credentialing and licensing for animal 
health professionals between states.  The workgroup recommended an 
investigation should be conducted to develop the data and make 
recommendations for a solution to enable interstate licensing and 
credentialing of animal health professionals.  
• Currently there is a nationwide project underway to type resources.  This 
is a process that develops distinct classification of resources (personnel 
and equipment) to provide for an interoperable system throughout the 
nation during a response to an incident.  To date, resources utilized to 
respond to or mitigate an agriculture related incident have not been 
thoroughly typed.  The workgroup recommended this process should be 
included in the national project.   
• The ability for plant and animal health specialists to respond to agro-
terrorist attacks of any magnitude requires the availability of rapid and 
modern diagnostic services either within the state or in relative close 
proximity to it.  The workgroup recommended a thorough evaluation of 
plant and animal diagnostic capacity be undertaken with an emphasis in 
sharing of laboratory capacity between states.   
• Facilitating the sharing of information to include data to provide for 
situational awareness 
From the focus areas, the group established the following three priorities:  
• Explore the Emergency Management Assistance Compact and 
similar agreements, which includes the license and credential 
issues 
                                                 
45 Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture Work Plan, August 2003. 
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• Investigate information sharing and situational awareness between 
states 
• Facilitate the sharing of laboratories and develop an animal 
pharmaceutical stockpile   
B. STATE-TO-STATE WORKGROUP 
The State-to-State Workgroup, led by the State of Kentucky, addressed issues of 
interstate collaboration as it relates to preventing, planning for, and responding to 
agricultural emergencies. The specific focus areas for this work group included:  
• Review and expand on the issues raised in a previous project entitled “The 
Central States Animal Health Emergency Plan”, specifically: 
• Communication protocols 
• Standardization of plans and protocols 
• Livestock movement policies 
• Develop a system for interstate communication, alert notification, and 
surveillance 
• Develop a system for joint training and exercising 
• Develop a system to share and compare written materials, for example,  
• Emergency response plans 
• Training and Educational materials 
• Exercise resources 
• Create a system to support ongoing discussions and information sharing 
between agencies 
From the focus areas, the group identified the following three priorities:  
• Interstate and interagency communications working closely with the 
information sharing and situational awareness subgroup of the resource 
sharing working group 
• Crop security 
• Emergency planning and response 
C. STATE-TO-FEDERAL WORKGROUP 
The State-to-Federal Workgroup, led by the State of Iowa, focused on how the 
state partners could best affect national policy and standards. The group has worked 
closely with the Federal departments of Homeland Security and Agriculture, and the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration, to affect policy change and influence funding streams.  
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This group has collectively addressed issues such as the Office of Domestic Preparedness 
Agriculture Assessment, as well as working with the federal executive and legislative 
branches to raise awareness of the partnership and its activities. 
D. WORKGROUP STRUCTURE      
The chart, in Figure 1, is an illustration of the initial workgroup structure.  Its 
intent is to demonstrate the workgroup focus areas and structure are flexible enough to 
accomplish the overall mission. 
 
 
Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture 
Resource Sharing Agreements State to State State to Federal 
EMAC Subgroup Information Sharing Communications Crop Security Planning 
 
Figure 1.   Workgroup Structure 
 
As early as February 2004, the states were already fulfilling one of the most 
important key principles that were necessary to address prior to taking action, that of 
building an understanding of common concerns and vulnerabilities with regard to safety 
and security of the U.S. food supply and agriculture.  This was demonstrated through 
work group efforts, by identifying the need for improved communications, surveillance 
and cooperation in animal identification. 
It became evident that the successful implementation of projects to fulfill the 
multi-state priorities would require funding.  The State-to-Federal Workgroup worked 
closely, in conjunction with the State of Iowa, to acquire a Department of Homeland 
Security Grant.  The three areas funded to provide resource support to the multi state 
effort follow. 
1. State to State Communications Strategy 
The Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture will build upon existing 
communications systems to develop a comprehensive agriculture communications 
strategy.  This strategy will include a communications plan, risk communications 
materials, and a system to facilitate interstate and public/private communications.   
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2. Model Electronic Syndromic Surveillance and Disease Reporting 
System 
The comprehensive system would incorporate a veterinary disease and syndromic 
surveillance reporting program.  Reporting would be done online allowing for ease in 
compilation and analysis. A model system would be created which could be specialized 
for each state’s needs. This model system would greatly increase prevention and 
mitigation capacity by providing states the capability to track disease incidence and 
allowing epidemiological experts to analyze syndromic data.   
3. Investigation and Development of Mechanisms for Interstate 
Collaboration in Animal Tracking 
The President directed the federal agencies to coordinate a national animal 
tracking system.  The Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture proposes 
investing in and developing a mechanism for interstate collaboration in animal tracking. 
The partnership will investigate issues surrounding information management, emergency 
notification abilities, GIS mapping functions, electronic health papers, and disease 
transmission modeling as related to animal tracking to identify areas of potential 
collaboration. As the USDA and other federal agencies have not officially announced the 
scope and requirements of the national animal tracking program, this portion of the grant 
proposal must be flexible.46 
In addition to the benefits resulting from receipt of the funding, some immediate 
results have occurred through these efforts as of February 2004: 
• Establishment of a committee structure of member states, which will make 
it possible to move forward in accomplishing the common goals and 
objectives.  This structure also provided the means to identify common 
concerns and problems; providing for the common focus. 
• Opening the lines of communications between states and the agencies on a 
day to day basis 





                                                 
46 Iowa Homeland Security & Emergency Management Grant Application to Department of 
Homeland Security, February 5, 2004. 
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• Raising the awareness level of the Federal agencies concerning: 
• The importance of agriculture security efforts 
• The need for Federal involvement 
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IV. BUILDING COLLABORATION 
The preceding chapter highlighted key substantive areas for collaboration that 
emerged in discussions by Partnership members.  Substantive issues were not the only 
topics that received attention, however.  The issue of how to build effective collaboration, 
and make the partnership effective, also took a great deal of attention and posed some 
difficult challenges.  As the collaborative process in the Partnership deepened, 
participants began to confront the question of whether to and how to formalize the 
emerging collaborative relationships.  This chapter provides an outline of the issues the 
Partnership grappled with in moving beyond the cooperative efforts already described, 
into more structured and (over time) perhaps even legally binding commitments.  The 
Chapter begins by outlining some of the basic choices that the Partners had to make 
(including choosing between compacts and administrative agreements as a vehicle to 
formalize collaborative efforts).  The Chapter then examines how participants were able 
to achieve consensus on the way ahead.  Again the intention of this material is to 
highlight issues that other states may confront in pursuing regional arrangements---for 
agro-terrorism and other threats to homeland security. 
States have a long history of developing formal compacts to address issues of 
shared concern. In an article by John J. Mountjoy, he succinctly provided: 
Not only are new compacts and revised compacts under development, but 
the way in which states are working to structure these new multi-state 
agreements has changed. Before World War II, interstate compacts 
primarily dealt with state boundaries or the sharing of common 
waterways. Modern compacts differ greatly, tackling broader public policy 
issues and forging state partnerships for problem solving and cooperation. 
Interstate compacts provide states the perfect vehicle to address regional 
and national issues that are affecting their jurisdictions as public policy 
issues become more complex and affect more states in our shrinking 
world, new interstate compacts could prove to be the answer to common 
problems involving public safety and the justice system, particularly those 
relating to the need for uniform standards and the sharing of information.  
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States should further use interstate compacts to address new problems and 
create new methods of interstate cooperation. If not, federal preemption in 
certain policy areas is a distinct possibility.47 
There are positive implications in using an interstate compact or agreement to 
implement state and national homeland security strategies.  For example, in April 2004, 
the Iowa Department of Transportation and the Iowa Homeland Security hosted the first 
multi-state networking workshop for transportation, homeland security, emergency 
management and law enforcement officials.  During the course of this brief workshop, it 
was evident that keen interest existed in the interchange of information and establishing 
common policies to address transportation security needs.   
A. COMPACTS 
Interstate compacts have been used by the states since the inception of the nation 
to address issues of common concern. Today, every state in the nation utilizes interstate 
compacts to achieve mutual objectives with one or more other states. Iowa alone is a 
signatory to at least 21 different statutory interstate compacts.48 
By definition, a compact is an agreement between two or more states that binds 
them to the compact’s provisions, just as a contract binds two or more parties in a 
business deal. As such, compacts are subject to the substantive principles of contract law 
and protection by the constitutional prohibition against laws that impair the obligations of 
contracts (cf. United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 10).49 
The process of forming a compact can be divided into three steps: negotiation, 
ratification, and approval. Negotiation is the process of developing the compact itself to 
ensure that it includes a clear statement of purpose, the appointment of an administrative  
                                                 
47 John J. Mountjoy, Corrections and Parole Trend in 2003: Interstate Compacts: An Alternative for 
Solving Common Problems Among States, Report on Trends in State Courts, available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_Parole_Trends03.pdf, accessed April 14, 2004. 
48 Through a search of the Code of Iowa. 
49 Interstate Compacts. Council of State Governments, programs, Interstate Compacts, available at 
http://www.csg.org/CSG/Programs, accessed August 2003. 
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agency if appropriate, a delineation of the agencies’ functions and duties, the 
identification of funding sources, the establishment of enforcement provisions, and a 
description of termination procedures.50 
Compacts must be ratified by the participating states through a process that 
includes the state legislatures and the governor. Compacts are ratified by state legislation 
or by popular vote. Once the legislation is adopted or the ballot measure approved, the 
governor must sign the compact into law or veto the measure. If the compact is approved 
through one of these two methods, it becomes a state statute and a binding agreement or 
contract between the states involved. 
Congressional and presidential approval is the actual final step to cement a formal 
agreement between the states. According to the Constitution’s “compact clause”, all 
interstate compacts must receive approval of the United States Congress and the signature 
of the president. The intent of this requirement is to ensure that state agreements do not 
intrude upon areas of federal authority, law, or interest.51 
Congress may grant consent to a compact prior to its formation or once it has 
been ratified by the states involved. It also has the power to limit or otherwise modify a 
multi-state compact. It can, with the help of the Supreme Court, compel compliance with 
compact provisions. Compacts take precedence over conflicting state laws regardless of 
when the state laws were enacted. Once approved, states may not unilaterally withdraw 
membership, as termination procedures outlined in the compact itself must be followed. 
Since compacts are enacted into law and approved by Congress and the president, and are  
                                                 
50 Matthew Sundeen and L. Cheryl Runyon, “Interstate Compacts and Administrative Agreements,” 
National Conference of State Legislatures, March 1998, available at 
www.ncsl.org/programs/esnr/slr238.htm, accessed August 2003. 
51 M. S. Briggett, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate Compact. Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review, vol. 12, no. 4 (1995), pp. 751-772. Council of State Governments, 
Programs, Interstate Compacts, available at 
http://www.csg.org/CSG/Programs/interstate+compacts/default.htm, accessed August 2003.   
Note: The State of Iowa’s membership in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (Iowa 
Code Chapter 29C…can serve as an example for the reader for an excellent interstate compact.  
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enforced by Constitutional provisions, they are considered the most effective, forceful, 
and binding method of ensuring interstate cooperation or of resolving interstate concerns, 
controversies, or conflicts.52 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS 
Administrative agreements between states are substantially different from 
interstate compacts. The most significant difference is that administrative agreements do 
not require Congressional approval, and as such, in terms of force of law, do not convey 
the strength and rigidity of compacts. Administrative agreements are either formal or 
informal.53 
Formal administrative agreements require states to enact reciprocal statutes that 
address particular issues, and by enacting such statutes, state officials can enter written 
cooperative arrangements with other states. Formal agreements may contain a purpose 
statement, procedures for governing the cooperation, and the establishment of an 
agreement administrator or commissioner.54 An example of a formal administrative 
agreement would be a multi-state lottery, such as the PowerBall Jackpot Lottery, of 
which Iowa is a member. 
Informal administrative agreements are not authorized by state statute and many 
are not even written documents. The agreement may or may not be a long-term 
arrangement and may only be used on an as-needed basis. These kinds of agreements are 
typically ad hoc agreements to provide some manner of assistance, or general agreements 
of understanding regarding a particular issue or concern. Most memoranda of 
understanding provide the parties with a “guide” to obligations, intentions, and policies, 
and while they can be written and signed, they are rarely authorized by statute. If a 
memorandum of understanding were to be authorized by statute, then it would be 
considered a formal administrative agreement.55 
                                                 
52Heron, K. J., The Interstate Compact in Transition: From Cooperative State Action to 
Congressionally Coerced Agreements. St. John’s Law Review, vol. 60, no. 1 (1985), pp. 1-25.  
53 Matthew Sundeen and L. Cheryl Runyon, “Interstate Compacts and Administrative Agreements,” 
National Conference of State Legislatures, March 1998, available at 




Tables 1 and 256 provide a cursory strength and weakness comparison of 
compacts and administrative agreements.  
 
Table 1. Interstate Compacts Strengths/Weaknesses 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Provides a durable, enforceable agreement 
• Specifically defines the nature and extent of 
future response collaborations and funding 
• Identifies when and how services or products 
are delivered 
• Backed by federal law and cannot be nullified 
by unilateral state action 
• Reduces the need for federal regulations or 
judicial adjudication of rights 
• The approval process is long and complicated 
• Penalties for non-compliance are a necessary but 
detracting component 
• Political opposition of a single member state can 
change the effectiveness of the entire arrangement 
 
 
Table 2. Administrative Agreements Strengths/Weaknesses 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Does not require the passage of legislation 
• Each member state can determine its level of 
participation without being bound statutorily 
• Less costly to enact 
• Easily maintained and deconstructed 
• Easily revisited and revised with changing 
political, social, or economic conditions 
• Essentially non-enforceable; disposable 
• Interpretation of informal language may differ 
• Can be pre-empted or nullified by legislation for 
other formal arrangements 
• Undefined responsibilities creates unfulfilled 
obligations 
 
Due to the nature of the threat and the immediacy of needing to take action the 
states are moving toward entering into an Administrative Agreement rather than a formal 
compact.   
They felt the approval process is too long and less costly to enact and more 
importantly it is easily changed given the ever changing threat situation.  
Many may have the preconceived notion the creation and building of interstate 
compacts or administrative agreements are much too difficult to pursue.  Some would say 
the pursuit of interstate agreements and partnerships could divert scarce resources away 
from individual state and local governments.  However, the conscious decision was made 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
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to pursue a multi state partnership to specifically address agro terrorism preparedness 
requirements, realizing the challenges could be a hindrance to success but with the vision 
that success would be invaluable to fighting the war on terrorism, specifically, agro-
terrorism.    
The people of Iowa, as well as the other partner states, recognized that the 
protection of the U.S. food supply chain is a critically important component of the U.S. 
national bio-defense system and that the food supply presents an accessible and efficient 
delivery system for attacks against large populations and economic sectors.  The creation 
of an interstate communications plan, disease specific risk information, a comprehensive 
interstate communications system, a model electronic syndromic surveillance and disease 
reporting system, and a mechanism and structure for states to collaborate on animal 
tracking issues would greatly increase preparedness and response capacity at state, and 
local levels, as well as provide an excellent point of coordination for the federal 
government. 
The author does not want to undervalue the organizational time and project 
planning commitments by the partner states. However, it is the author’s assertion that the 
value of collaborating toward common goals and objectives far outweighs the difficulty 
of addressing the problems on an individual state basis.  An interstate compact or 
administrative agreement57, in Figure 2, combines strengths and eliminates weaknesses, 
creating model programs that can be shared between states. It is also the author’s  
assertion that through the creation of shared programs, not just in agro-terrorism, will 
reduce costs and duplication, while increasing program consistency and state-to-state 
interoperability. 
                                                 
57 Figure 2 is an example Administrative Agreement. (developed by Dr. Ann Garvey, Iowa Homeland 
Security) utilizing the National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information System 
Agreement, available at www.paphsis.orgNAPHSIS, accessed on February 2004. 
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INTERSTATE COOPERATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT 
 
Through entering this interstate cooperative administrative agreement, the state of 
_________________ recognizes the importance of ensuring that America's agricultural system is 
secure, its citizens are safe and its economy is strong.  Through this interstate cooperative 
administrative agreement, states will collaborate on surveillance of, preparation for, and response to 
threats in agriculture, whether intentionally introduced or naturally occurring, and coordinate these 
efforts with all levels of Government.  
 
Therefore, the state of _________________ agrees to the following: 
 
1. To support the Partnership’s principles as stated below:  
• Promote awareness of agro-security issues within all levels of government.   
• Develop partnerships among states, federal agencies, producers, and private industry to 
build a unified approach to agriculture and food security.  
• Explore interstate resource sharing for agriculture emergencies. 
• Create a system for states to participate in joint planning, education, training, and 
exercise opportunities.  
• Improve coordination and information sharing among agencies at the federal, state, and 
local levels.  
• Develop joint strategies for maintaining public and consumer confidence. 
• Build state and federal surveillance and response capacity.  
 
2. To establish a Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture Steering Committee and 
authorize the Steering Committee to make all decisions on behalf of the Partnership. 
• Each State will appoint one member to the steering committee and decisions will be 
made by majority opinion. 
 
3. To empower the State to State Working Group to act on behalf of the Partnership under the 
approval of the Steering Committee. 
• The State to State Working Group is composed of volunteer representatives from each 
participating state agency.   
• The role of the State to State Working Group is to define and develop the priorities, 
goals, projects, and initiatives of the Partnership and present this information to the 
Steering Committee for approval. 
• With the approval of the Steering Committee, the State to State Working Group will 
implement and execute the Partnership’s projects and initiatives.  
 
 
Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture 
 
A Cooperative Agreement of States United 
For Agriculture Counter-Terrorism Preparedness 
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• To authorize the State to Federal Working Group to represent the Partnership on the 
Federal level. 
• The State to Federal Working Group will serve as the lobbying arm of the Partnership. 
• The State to Federal Working Group will monitor legislation and federal regulatory 
activities that may affect the partnership. 
• When appropriate, the State to Federal Working Group will draft position statements and 
proposals for the Partnership and present this information to the Steering committee for 
signature and approval.    
 
4. This interstate cooperative administrative agreement is valid for two years from the date of 
signature and is thereafter renewable on an annual basis by mutual agreement.   
• Each state will review this agreement as needed and make any appropriate changes by 











________________________________   ___________________________________ 
 













To provide the reader with the basic process in creating an interstate partnership, 
experiences recorded throughout the process in late 2003-early 2004 appear below, and, 
specifically for the Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture. 
C. CONDUCT AN INTERNAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
• Define the challenges 
• Identify the gaps 
It is important when advancing such a project that challenges and gaps be 
identified.  For example, a significant need existed to increase the agriculture terrorism 
preparedness capacity, but there was also a desire to develop capabilities consistent with 
other states and the federal government.  The gap in the lack of federal direction guiding 
states was recognized and the participants were anxious to begin. The impression was 
that states were independently addressing their agriculture planning needs and there did 
not seem to be significant interstate communication. In addition, within any enterprise 
system, it is imperative that all agencies work together.  For an effective interstate 
agreement, the Governor needs to be involved in the initiative. In addition, in the case of 
Iowa’s interstate agriculture security partnership, it was imperative to have the 
commitment of the Iowa Secretary of Agriculture, also a statewide elected official, to 
achieve success. 
D. BEGIN ONE-ON-ONE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER 
STAKEHOLDERS 
• Pick up the phone and start discussions.  
• Are the counterparts in the other states facing similar challenges? If so, 
how are they addressing them? 
• Are there additional issues to address?  
This is an important step.  It can serve as a validation from the internal to the 
external process.  The process is to begin developing the information and data to 
ascertain if other states, or stakeholders share the same concerns and just as important, if 
they have issues and concerns not yet realized. 
E. INVENTORY THE STAKEHOLDER’S CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES 
• When talking to the Stakeholders, annotate common themes and issues 
In the early discussions, it soon became apparent the other states did share the 
same concerns and challenges in addressing the agro-terrorism preparedness 
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requirements, and specifically, concerning a lack of awareness and leadership from the 
federal level and a lack of interstate consistency.  This step is invaluable toward the 
development of common principles, goals and objectives. 
F. ASSEMBLE A SMALL DISCUSSION GROUP TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION WOULD BE OF 
MUTUAL BENEFIT 
• By having stakeholders attend a group discussion, they will begin to 
realize what information has already been amassed through one-on-one 
discussions. 
• As a group, decide whether there are benefits of collaboration.  
Two conference calls were conducted involving the Homeland Security Directors 
from Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, and Kansas. During this call, the discussion also 
included whether it would be beneficial to work together, and the consensus was that it 
would be.  
G. OUTLINE THE GROUPS KEY ISSUES AND PRINCIPLES 
• Once the group has decided to work together, the first task should be 
outlining key principles and issues, which aids in focusing the group. 
Following the initial conference call, each state annotated their agriculture issues 
and principles.  The lists were compiled to form the group’s key issues and principles.  
This was the beginning of the Multi-State Partnership for Agriculture Security and the 
development of the mission statement and principles.   
H. MEET IN PERSON TO DEVELOP GROUP STRUCTURE AND 
DIRECTION 
• It has been determined that the group wants to work together and the 
principles outlined, but now it is necessary to decide on how to move 
forward.  
• Logistically how will the collaboration proceed? 
• How to divide and conquer the challenges?  
• Buy-in is essential.  
It is imperative to bring all of the stakeholders together, face-to-face to have open 
and honest discussions.  The Iowa Secretary of Agriculture and the author hosted the first 
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Agro-Security Summit in August 2003, with six invited states in attendance.58 At the 
Summit, the group reached a consensus to develop a workgroup59 structure to address 
common issues. Each state appointed a member to each group with a volunteer to chair 
each committee.   
I. FURTHER DEVELOP OBJECTIVES AND GOALS 
• How specifically to address the challenges? 
• What objectives and goals need to be met?  
To develop the common goals and objectives, it is efficient to do so within the 
established structure. Therefore, in this case, each of the workgroups developed goals and 
priorities, as referenced in Chapter III.  These goals and objectives were very helpful in 
the search of support. 
J. DESIGN AN AWARENESS CAMPAIGN TO GARNER ADDITIONAL 
FUNDING AND SUPPORT 
• How to fund the efforts? 
• Whose support is necessary to be successful? 
• Utilize the Funding to Establish Tangible and Mutually Beneficial 
Solutions  
• Design programs with visible outcomes. 
• In the end, be prepared to document and demonstrate the successes.  
When embarking upon an interstate initiative, and with a developed “work-plan” 
that will serve as the means to achieve the goals and objectives, it is at this point that the 
resource development process begins.  The states continued to emphasize that the federal 
government should consider Agro-Terrorism Preparedness as an important agenda item.  
The State to Federal workgroup developed a resource strategy.  
Meetings were arranged with key Congressional staff and federal agency 
representatives to market this plan, build awareness and garner support.  Governor 
Vilsack and the author met with Secretary Veneman and her staff, during which, it 
became apparent that the United States Department of Agriculture was not going to 
                                                 
58 Note: KS, WI, SD, IL, MN, MO Departments of Agriculture, Departments of Homeland Security 
and Departments of Emergency Management.  In addition, we had state based USDA representatives 
attend.  
59 Note: Workgroups were: State to State; State to Federal and Cooperative Resource Sharing as 
explained in Chapter III. 
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support these efforts or lead on their own.  At the same time, efforts were also directed 
toward the United States Department of Homeland Security.  Secretary Tom Ridge 
immediately understood the importance of the interstate efforts in addressing agro-
terrorism and made an immediate commitment to support these efforts, which ultimately 
resulted in a $2 million grant from the Department of Homeland Security to support the 
Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis is a call to action for state government officials to demonstrate 
leadership by aggressively pursuing the development of interstate collaboration for 
homeland security, in agro-terrorism and beyond.  It is not possible to defend American 
agriculture against foreign or domestic terrorism if multi-state collaborative initiatives 
focused on food security are not developed. The issues surrounding agro-terrorism are 
vast and complex and the resources of the Federal government to address these issues are 
limited and overextended. To achieve substantial levels of detection, preparedness, and 
response the states must collaborate voluntarily to address mutual concerns, key policies, 
and strategic operational issues related to agro-terrorism. 
Interstate compacts or administrative agreements for agro-terrorism preparedness 
can serve as a vital component to enhance state abilities to detect, deter, prevent and 
respond to acts of agro-terrorism.  Agriculture production and food processing systems 
overlap state boundaries.  Iowa assets in this area are connected with downstream and 
upstream with out-of-state assets.  Contamination in one area can contaminate multiple 
areas as goods traverse across state lines.  Radiological, biological, and chemical agents 
and diseases (animal and plant) can cross state boundaries to create national problems 
requiring regional responses.  Psychologically, the Midwest represents the “heartland” of 
the nation, and agriculture its mainstay.  An attack on the nation’s food supply/system 
would be devastating.  
The safety of America’s food supply has long been a priority for the State of 
Iowa.  Iowa is leading a cooperative effort with nine other states called the Multi-State 
Partnership for Security in Agriculture.  Through the partnership, states collaborate on 
surveillance of, preparation for, and response to threats in agriculture, whether introduced 
intentionally or naturally occurring, and coordinate these efforts with all levels of 
Government.  The current participating states include Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Agriculture 
Secretaries, Homeland Security advisors, Emergency Management directors, and State 
Veterinarians are represented in the group. The Partnership exemplifies the substantive 
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benefits that can be derived from interstate collaboration in agro-security.   The 
Partnership also provides a roadmap for other collaborative initiatives, by demonstrating 
how consensus can be built across state borders despite the difficulties. It is imperative 
the states combine strengths and eliminate weaknesses, creating model programs to share 
between states.  The creation of shared programs will reduce costs and duplication, while 
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